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ABSTRACT
OFFSHORING EFFECTIVENESS: MEASUREMENT AND IMPROVEMENT WITH
OPTIMIZATION APPROACH
By Dip Biswas
This study takes a refreshing look at IT outsourcing from a vendor's perspective
and discusses best practices required to effectively manage offshore business needs and
offshoring effectiveness. We have conducted a detailed investigation to learn why
outsourcing ventures fail, how to effectively measure up to service provider capability,
and how to deliver strategic value to the end customer. Extant literature does not talk
about the vendor's issues and problems in outsourcing, and our investigation emphasized
the vendor's perspective on offshoring strategy and offshore resource effectiveness as the
two important differentiators in a make-or-buy decision. Measurement metrics for each
of the two items were devised to estimate their effect on offshoring effectiveness. We
spoke to some of the top 10 IT vendors in India, collected offshoring data from both
clients and vendors, and used the data to validate our decision framework. The
framework helps us to investigate current industry practices in IT outsourcing, identify
issues and problems beyond the obvious advantages of outsourcing, and propose
measures to assess offshoring effectiveness. The investigation gave us an opportunity to
record the best IT practices as well as suggest possible improvements in the service or
product delivery cycle to enhance customer experience.
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CHAPTER 1: The Problem Scenario

1.1 Introduction
With the year 2000 dot-com boom behind us and another boom not likely to
happen, Silicon Valley and the rest of the country are increasingly relying on emerging
offshore information technology (IT) markets for software solutions and services. Today
outsourcing is driven by decreasing communication costs combined with increasing
research and development capabilities in low and medium cost countries. Outsourcing
has helped companies speed up product development in order to decrease time-to-market,
free up their resources to focus on core business or work on strategic development
activities, and effectively manage capacity by smoothing out cyclical variations in
demand with the help of offshore service providers (Willcocks & Lacity, 2006). It is a
known fact that many companies have poured billions of dollars in outsourcing their IT
operations and are reaping rich rewards. It is worth noting that the obvious advantages in
outsourcing have made it an attractive value proposition, and although there are certain
trade-offs, majority stakeholders have not singled out offshoring as unprofitable or
pressured U.S. companies to start hiring or retraining displaced workers when jobs are
lost. On the other hand, jobs have steadily moved offshore in the last decade benefiting
the developing nations that have a large pool of technology workers, but causing many a
heartbreak for U.S. job-seekers (Yourdon, 2004). It is apparent that the trend in
outsourcing is not reversible and will continue to grow, creating jobs in developing
countries.
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Outsourcing in IT is not a recent phenomenon. In his book Outsource - Competing
in the Global Productivity Race, Yourdon (2004) talks about outsourcing and
globalization as mainstream phenomena, with 45% of U.S. companies having outsourced
IT functions to offshore-based companies between 2000 and 2004. In the 1960s and
1970s, key-punching and data-entry activities were outsourced. However, these were
menial tasks not requiring a high degree of skill. IT outsourcing in its present form began
to take shape in the early 2000s when the U.S. was hit hard by a hi-tech recession.
Between 2000 and 2004, U.S.-based employers shifted tens of thousands of IT jobs to
countries such as India, China, Russia, and the Philippines. The globalization
phenomenon, which in part was encouraged by economic liberalization and deregulation
in countries such as India and China, has had significant consequences. U.S. workers
have lost jobs while competing with hard-working, low-cost, high-quality knowledge
workers around the world. Consumers have more choices, and cheaper products are on
the market. It is worth noting that offshoring is usually not part of the product lifecycle
but is often applied as an afterthought and a by-product of the acquisition process.
Dysfunctional back-offices often occur when large companies grow through mergers and
acquisitions, dragging along and neglecting back-office stepchildren. Increased workload
and technical expertise is usually supported by onsite service providers or partners, who
offer an incremental improvement approach to resolve issues and add mobility to the
existing business functions. This results in over-staffed, duplicate, and incompatible
back-offices and the back-office function eventually becomes a candidate for offshoring
(Willcocks & Lacity, 2006). Outsourcing the back-offices makes for a better value-
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proposition for the acquirer firm, and consequently the focus shifts to building
relationships with transformational service providers located in cost-effective destinations
who are better equipped to trim the excess fat, restore sanity, and improve the company's
bottom-line.
IT companies are expected to have a defined acquisition strategy and vision before
entering into an agreement with an outsourcing service provider (Willcocks, Reynolds, &
Feeny, 2007). The outsourcer (acquirer) wants to acquire a product or a service from a
vendor to satisfy the following core needs:
1. Gain access to high-demand technology skills.
2. Pool together internal technology resources and use as needed.
3. Focus on a set of core business capabilities.
4. Respond more rapidly to business changes.
5. Reduce capital investments.
6. Achieve flexibility to grow or shrink as the business demands.
7. Improve return on investment (ROI) and the company bottom-line.
The acquirer may also determine that setting up offshore captive centers might be a better
acquisition strategy to support core-business needs and improve the profitability of the
company. The offshore captive center and outsource service providers may be profitably
used to access new technologies and special technology skills, gain a competitive edge,
or fulfill a desire to gain economies of scale and reduce overall costs (Boehe, 2008). At
the same time, acquirers look to improve the quality of services that are outsourced,
maximize their return on investments, and protect the interest of the stakeholders.
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1.2 Problem statement
Offshoring is beset with problems caused by communication delays, lack of
knowledge transition, inadequate requirement analyses, and inadequate quality measures.
Offshore resource effectiveness and offshore business strategy are important criteria for
the client in selecting the vendor that provides best value for their money. The primary
purpose of this study is to conduct analytical research of current acquirer-supplier models
and to estimate offshoring effectiveness for a service provider located in a cost-effective
offshore destination.
1.3 Sub-problems
Additional aims for this study are to conduct an investigation into the issues and
problems that occur in the acquisition process, to understand risk management and
disaster preparedness of the service provider, and to identify cultural issues local to the
client and offshore destination.
1.4 Definitions
Client (Acquirer) - Client is the recipient of outsourcing services.
Outsourcing - Outsourcing is subcontracting a process, such as product design or
manufacturing; or subcontracting a request for designing, supporting, and maintaining
supply of services, to an external service provider company.
Offshoring - Offshoring describes the relocation by a company of a business process
from one country to another - typically an operational process, such as manufacturing, or
supporting processes, such as accounting ("Offshoring," 2009).
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) - In economics and related disciplines, a transaction
cost is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. The main objective of TCE is to
identify the conditions under which market governance (e.g., outsourcing) is more cost
efficient than governance within the boundaries of a firm (Dibbern, Winkler, & Heinzl,
2008).
Vendor (Service Provider) - Vendor is the entity or organization supplying outsourced
services.
1.5 Research objective
Extant literature on outsourcing does not elaborate on the problems, issues, and
shortcomings from a vendor perspective. The researcher decided to address this gap by
focusing on the major issues that dominate outsourcing of services. An analytical study
was conducted to understand the client's motivation for outsourcing and if offshoring was
inclusive of his or her product life-cycle (Schniederjans et al., 2007). It was observed
that only a few clients consider outsourcing as part of their product life-cycle. These
clients eventually end up outsourcing their back-office processes when they become
unwieldy, expensive, and out-of-control. It is thus necessary for the service provider to
devise an effective strategy to address the client's unanticipated needs and to grow and
shrink as per the client's demand. At the same time, the vendor is expected to have
capacity and capability to meet any client need and to have maximum capacity utilization
to stay competitive and win repeat business.
It is also necessary to understand how difficult it is to move away from a
manufacturing mindset to one that is service-based and to understand the challenges that
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IT service providers are facing while making these changes (Giao, Junior, &
Vasconcellos, 2008). The researcher will study ways and means to reduce offshoring
risks, transaction costs, and the total costs of outsourcing from a service provider
perspective, and will evaluate what it takes to make an offshore resource productive for
both the client and the vendor. Thus, the research objectives will be (1) to focus on the
offshoring strategy, (2) to analyze offshore resource effectiveness, and (3) to understand
how these key factors play an important role in defining the outsourcing relationship
between a client and a vendor.
1.6 Thesis justification
It has been observed that some companies have adopted outsourcing just because
their competitors are doing business in another country and have been successful with it.
Most companies believe outsourcing is the only option to survive and thrive in a global
economy. What is not apparent is whether the outsourcers have established an economic
rationale behind their drive to outsource and have executed their business strategy in line
with their goals of achieving improved productivity, gaining a new competency, and
seeking potential improvement opportunities in their organization (Weeks & Feeny,
2008; Willcocks, Reynolds, & Feeny, 2007). On the other side of the coin, it is not
obvious if the outsourced service provider attaches any importance to governance, or is
able to foresee and mitigate any risks at different stages of the product lifecycle. It is
apparent from the literature survey that there is no one solution to tackle offshoring issues
and that there are suppliers of varying capability and maturity (Wadhwa & Ravindran,
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2006). It is important to investigate how they manage cost overruns, schedule breaches,
depleted resource capability, and labor arbitrage.
In the quest to evaluate and improve outsourced processes, the researcher did not
find hard evidence on the effectiveness of the acquirer - service provider relationship and
the cost drivers responsible for the success or failure of the partnership. The researcher
also did not find conclusive evidence on a business model that supports the idea of
establishing a captive center to work on core and non-core processes, rather than having a
vendor perform all of the outsourcing functions for the client. The researcher felt it was
necessary to investigate the alternate scenarios and analyze managerial decision-making
choices in outsourcing. The underlying economic rationale behind the investigation is to
document the best practices of offshoring engineering programs to cost effective
destinations and propose measures to evaluate and improve the existing processes by
using an optimization approach.
1.6.1 Offshore resource effectiveness.
The single most important driver behind judging offshoring effectiveness is
employee performance. It is a known fact that there is a glut of hard-working, low-cost,
high-quality knowledge workers in cost-effective destinations like India or China (King,
2006). However, if it is not possible to achieve performance and productivity of one
offshore person equivalent to one onsite person, we do not stand to benefit from such a
relationship. It is important in this context to evaluate the effectiveness of the offshore
hires in terms of their level of training and preparedness, and understand why they do not
meet the onsite client expectations (Manning, Massini, & Lewin, 2008). It is often found
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that the outsourced workforce has a difficult time while working with onsite clients.
Communication delays and failure to communicate, lack of sufficiency in requirement
analysis, and irresponsible or careless workers who never bothered about maintaining or
documenting their code are some of the major headaches. Sometimes the onsite workers,
who have been asked to train the offshore workers, fear losing their jobs and
consequently do not bother to make their best effort to support effective knowledge
transition. At other times, there is a lack of product knowledge and business knowledge
that stand in the way of obtaining timely results (Dibbern et al., 2008). It is important to
keep in mind these situations to evaluate resource effectiveness while the vendor is
engaged with the client. It is not advisable to do offshoring for labor arbitrage if cost
savings vanish for productivity losses due to communication delays.
It is also important to investigate what it takes to retain more experienced technical
staff at the top who can walk the talk with client technology and business owners to
reduce communication delays and ensure a smooth transition of knowledge to offshore.
In this context, the researcher plans to investigate if the vendors are more interested in
making their margins by hiring people at the bottom of their experience and
qualifications, or are genuinely concerned with the quality of work they produce for the
client. At the outset, it appears that building and staffing a captive center for offshoring
projects would be a better value proposition to the client rather that outsourcing its IT
support organization (Nakatsu & Iacovou, 2009).

8

1.6.2 Off shoring strategy.
A successful business strategy encompasses a mechanism that effectively generates
demand for offshore business, delivers value to the end users, and at the same time
preserves the interests of the stakeholders. It is important to understand the roadmap of
the client, keep up with the technology trends, and help the marketing function generate
demand for new business development to meet existing capability (Cha, Pingry, &
Thatcher, 2008). The service provider can thus sync up with the acquirer strategy and
build an effective execution plan with adequate training and hiring plans, and acquire
necessary infrastructure for client needs at their location. A captive center need not
worry about generating business demand since much of their work is directed from the
onsite parent company. It is all the more challenging for the offshore-based organization
to compete globally, keep costs down, and at the same time sustain and grow the
business. In tough economic times, when the U.S. government seeks to allay recession
fears on the one hand, while on the other hand companies are drastically cutting jobs and
slashing budgets, it is all the more important that the offshore service provider has
established an economic rationale to sustain the product development from offshore,
provide online support, and add value to improve business outcomes (Tadelis, 2007;
Weeks & Feeny, 2008). In an uncertain economic future, the big corporations want to
add to the company bottom-line and move their support and non-core businesses
offshore, but at the same time it is important to consider the associated risks of running
an outsourced operation while keeping the domestic customers satisfied. It might seem
that establishing captive centers is a better long term solution in terms of investment
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horizon, but it also calls for staffing with the right skill-sets or relocating U.S.-based
technology workers to cost-effective countries on a permanent basis. It is very important
to justify the economic choices made by the client management, whether to seek an
offshore partner or establish a captive center to support development for their core and
non-core businesses.
Most IT companies do not consider vendor development as a top priority in an
outsourcing relationship. In tough economic times, it is even harder to justify time and
effort invested on the outsourced organization, since the single most important thing to
the client is cutting costs and weathering the storm. However, knowledge integration is
an important driver for improving vendor productive capability (Dibbern et al., 2008).
Vendors are also seeking opportunity to learn from the clients, set up a new line of
business, and add to their resume while courting prospective future clients and are willing
to market at a discounted price. In Japan, the most prevalent form of outsourcing is to
direct subsidiaries or captive centers, followed by an increasingly popular model where
the client has a direct financial stake in the vendor (Tiwana, Bush, Tsuji, Yoshida, &
Sakurai, 2008). Traditionally, Japanese companies are intellectually property-driven and
quality-driven, and consequently have a strong disinclination to rely on formal contracts.
At the same time, the drivers behind outsourcing initiatives in Japan do not always match
the cost-optimization philosophy of the service provider or do not help the vendor gain a
new skill or competency from the client.
As part of offshore business strategy, it is also important to understand the vendor
pricing structure, how vendors make their margins, and their strategies to deal with lost
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opportunity costs, communication delay costs, item rework costs, and alternative
scenarios that can be used to improve the existing processes. It is important to keep in
mind that offshore outsourcing partners may conceal the full potential of cost savings in
order to increase their own margin, and that trade-off between effectiveness and costs is
most important in decisions concerning offshoring, since lower technological experience
may offset low cost gains (Boehe, 2008).
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CHAPTER 2: Review of the Literature

2.1 Introduction
The literature review was undertaken in an effort to learn about the current industry
practices in IT outsourcing and to better understand the problems and shortcomings that
are behind outsourcing failures. In the literature survey, topics that are important from
the vendor's perspective and a comparative evaluation of the case studies are presented.
The researcher intends to use this information to measure offshoring effectiveness and to
propose measures for improvement to the outsourcing function.
Outsourcing by definition involves transferring ownership of an organization's
business activities to an outside provider. The provider could be an offshore captive
center situated in a cost-effective location or an external service provider situated in the
same country or in one of the major outsourcing destinations. The scope of the literature
research was limited to analyzing the trends in offshoring strategy and offshore resource
effectiveness, and the goal was to determine industry best practices for IT outsourcing.
As part of that exercise, the researcher decided to examine the following key categories:
service capability assessment; cross-cultural issues in IT outsourcing; trust, control, costs
and IT outsourcing; and offshore risk mitigation.
2.2 Service capability assessment
A significant amount of time and effort is spent in determining the right service
provider for the client's outsourcing need. More often than not, firms weigh their options
of setting up offshoring centers against working with external service providers. This
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approach has its inherent advantages for clients, who believe they can have their say in
handpicking their technical resources, thereby ensuring success of offshoring operations.
However, it is not always advisable to set up captive centers for all clients since it does
not let client firms reap benefits from economies of scale. At the same time, it has been
observed that offshoring is not a part of the client's product lifecycle and that the client
has resorted to offshoring only when their back-offices are too difficult to manage, or are
unresponsive to change. When clients acquire businesses, they go through a phase of
department mergers, layoffs, and end up with business units or back-office processes that
have a potential to be better managed offshore (Willcocks & Lacity, 2006).
As part of the outsourcing exercise, clients need to take a look at their businesses
and identify the core, critical, key, and support functions (Duening & Click, 2005). If it
is core and strategic to the client's business, clients would want to keep the business
function with them since it is a competitive advantage for the client. They would also
consider sending business to their offshore captive center where they would not risk
losing that competitive edge. The next step would be to identify the critical, key, and
support functions and determine if they are tightly coupled to the core function and their
degree of importance in the overall pursuit of excellence in the core business. When the
outsourcing candidates are identified, clients would start evaluating multiple vendors and
assess their capabilities.
It is widely known that there is no dearth of low-cost, highly skilled talent in the
well-known outsourcing destinations. However, the immediate need for the client is to
identify resources and capabilities that are valuable, low-cost, difficult to imitate, and
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difficult to substitute for its unique business need. It is often found that many clients
make a major mistake when assessing suppliers: they tend to assess suppliers' resources
such as physical facilities, technology, and workforce composition, rather than supplier
capabilities required to effectively manage and deploy these resources for the client's
benefit. Capability has been defined as a distinctive set of human-based skills,
orientations, attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that transform resources into specific
business activities (Willcocks & Lacity, 2006). Collections of capabilities, in turn, create
high-level strategic competencies that positively influence business performance. A
better way to assess the suppliers is by considering the 12 supplier capabilities (Willcocks
& Lacity, 2006). These are leadership, planning and contracting, organizational design,
governance, customer development, process improvement, technology exploitation,
program management, sourcing, behavior management, domain expertise, and business
management. Clients should also evaluate the three types of competency that the supplier
might bring to the table:
•

Relationship competency - the extent to which the supplier is willing and able
to align with client needs and goals over time.

•

Delivery competency - the extent to which the supplier can respond to client's
day-to-day operational requirements.

•

Transformation competency - the extent to which the supplier can deliver
client's need for service improvements.

Each supplier has its unique level of competency which may or may not be in the client's
best interest. The task for the client is then finding the best match with its unique need to
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ensure a successful outcome in its outsourcing decision. The right vendor is one who will
meet and complement the organization's needs, including aspects from its corporate
culture to long-term future needs (Wadhwa & Ravindran, 2006).
There are many challenges to be overcome while integrating an external service
provider with the firm. Willcocks et al. (2007) discuss the successes and failures, client
expectations, project management issues, and complexity of problems the client had to
solve while implementing major IT outsourcing arrangements at Dupont from 1997 to
2004. Their research suggests that a successful IT function has four overall tasks:
eliciting and delivering on business requirements; ensuring technical capability;
managing external supply; and governance, coordination, and leadership. They also talk
about the importance of maturity in the business units' capability to manage IT
strategically and the role of the IT function (Willcocks et al., 2007). However, their
research does not provide conclusive evidence on how well the supplier's capacity was
utilized in terms of infrastructure and resources. It also does not talk about the
measurement metrics that can be used to evaluate information systems (IS) outsourcing
capabilities and how they would be measured.
Innovation or improved business outcome may have a positive effect on
outsourcing (Weeks & Feeny, 2008). From the authors' investigation, it appears that the
primary driver behind outsourcing is always cost, and that the management focus is
always on solving problems that create roadblocks. These include realigning the contract
to client business objectives, renegotiating contract terms, rationalization of technology
infrastructure, reducing IT cost levels beyond the contract terms to cope with market
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downturns, organizational restructuring to align with business strategy, focusing on the
core strengths, and passing on the burden of improving the quality and integrity of a
fragmented asset base, partly inherited through a merger activity, to an external firm.
However, it appears that the client's expectation of an innovative value-added solution
from the supplier takes the backseat with the above-mentioned items grabbing the
spotlight most of the time. It also appears that the clients were not able to decide
unanimously on what actually qualified as innovation - a new technology capability, a
business process change, or the introduction of new services.
The services industry is a significant driver for worldwide economic growth.
Guidance on developing and improving mature service practices is a key contributor to
the performance, customer satisfaction, and profitability of the economic community.
The Capability Maturity Model (CMM) for Services (CMMI-SVC), a worldwide
certification developed by the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon
University, is designed to begin meeting that need (Software Engineering Institute, 2008).
All CMMI-SVC model practices focus on the activities of the service provider. The
seven process areas that focus on practices specific to services address capacity
availability and management, service continuity, service delivery, incident resolution and
prevention, service transition, service system development, and strategic service
management. The supplier is expected to achieve competency levels in the above service
deliverables to meet client's service needs successfully. The competency levels can be
measured in terms of continuous and staged representations of capability levels in service
performance. The continuous representation is measured by capability levels and the
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staged representation by maturity levels. It serves as a useful guideline for clients to
evaluate their capability in a process area that is relevant to their service needs.
However, it should be noted that it is difficult to measure services that are intangible,
inseparable, and customizable. The acquirer and the service provider may each evaluate
and certify the performance and quality of such services, but there might be different
yardsticks to measure service performance on both sides. Kotabe, Murray, and Chandra
(as cited in Schniederjans et al., 2007) conducted research in 14 service industries and
found that higher the inseparability of the service activity, the lower the propensity to use
outsourcing among clients, while in other situations the outsourcers restructured their
relationships with the service providers to counteract the difficulty of monitoring
performance of the outsourced service activity. Their research also underscores the
effectiveness of an offshore captive center working in harmony with external service
providers to reap the real benefits of outsourcing.
2.3 Cross-cultural issues in IT outsourcing
Outsourcing has been welcomed by most developing countries that see it as a
mechanism for inflow of much-needed foreign investments and job-creation. However,
in some countries the technology transfer process is still mired with red tape and sadly
the infrastructure is not yet ready. The political climate and the readiness of the people to
embrace a foreign work culture can quickly outweigh the initial euphoria and cost
advantages that outsourcing promises to bring. At the outset, it may appear that these
countries have the same level of skills and cost-advantages but each geographic region
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has its unique features and cultural nuances that the outsourcer needs to be aware of to
fully exploit the benefits of outsourcing.
Cultural differences, geographic distance, and language barriers can directly affect
the quality and ease of interaction between client and vendor. The most obvious
challenges are language barriers (Rao, 2004). If the client and the vendor speak different
languages, communication becomes difficult. This hampers knowledge transfer between
client and vendor and increases the likelihood of false specification due to
misunderstandings (Apte, 1990). This can lead to deterioration of trust, and an increase
in control and coordination costs. Knowledge absorptive capacity of an external service
provider can be affected by geographical distance if knowledge about unique business
processes needs to be transferred by the client. Since this type of knowledge is best
acquired through a process of socialization (Nonaka, 1994) via face-to-face meetings
(Nonaka & Konno, 1998), both the client and the external service provider need to
socialize, avoid double-speak, and exhibit generally accepted patterns of behavior. Case
studies on offshoring from Anglo-American countries to India indicate that opposing
attitudes toward authority, hierarchy, and power may cause differences in criticism and
feedback behavior between client and vendor personnel (Heeks, Krishna, Nicholson, &
Sahay, 2001; Krishna, Sahay, & Walsham, 2004).
Client expectations from outsourcing relationships can also differ from one
customer to another. Indian software companies have found they need to approach
communication with U.S. and Japanese clients in very different ways. U.S. client
companies normally work with extensive written agreements and explicit documentation,
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reinforced with frequent and informal telephone and email contact. In contrast, Japanese
clients tend to prefer verbal communication, more tacit and continuously negotiated
agreements, and less frequent but more formal use of electronic media (Krishna et al.,
2004). At the same time, many Indian software suppliers have acquired knowledge in the
telecommunications and e-business domains through projects carried out for North
American and European companies. This has reportedly raised the interest level with
some Japanese outsourcers, who are keen to learn from the Indian software suppliers
about leading-edge business systems in these domains. Tiwana et al. (2008) confirms
that Japanese companies are traditionally intellectually property-driven and qualitydriven, and consequently have a strong disinclination to rely on formal contracts. At the
same time, the drivers behind outsourcing initiatives in Japan do not always match the
cost-optimization or value-add motivation for the service provider based out of India. It
has also been reported that British managers in an outsourcing relationship with a
particular Indian software supplier found that Indian programmers, in deference to
authority, would not question or voice criticism in face-to-face meetings but would
sometimes send their opinions in emails after the meetings had disbanded. The British
managers, who are used to intense interaction and the development of ideas through
meetings, felt frustrated at this behavior (Krishna et al., 2004). This reflected negatively
on the knowledge absorptive capacity, and highlighted problems related to
communication skills and language barriers, as well as a failure in displaying accepted
patterns of behavior.
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A client-side point person who can effectively bridge cultures is usually employed
by clients to facilitate the knowledge flows between onsite and external service providers.
However, it is difficult to hire and retain such people in some countries. In Japan, money
is not the deciding factor for prospective employees; rather many Japanese are very
concerned about the status of the employing company rather than merely the salary. This
is one of the problems that Indian companies, for example, have in recruiting employees
in Japan. Similarly, German companies often find it difficult to locate managers with the
appropriate personality profile for directing their development centers in Asia. Apart
from the effort required to hire such a technically competent person, it is expected that
recruitment and retention packages have to match realities of these issues in specific
contexts and labor markets (Krishna et al., 2004). Many outsourcing service providers
offer cultural and etiquette training before assigning their staff to projects. Cultural
training is often perceived as necessary only in one direction, namely for the staff from
the service provider to learn about the culture of the countries of their client
organizations. However, these language and cultural practices training programs merely
serve to facilitate the offshoring relationship but do not guarantee the success of the
outsourcing relationship.
2.4 Trust, control, costs and IT outsourcing
The most critical factors affecting the vendor selection process are vendor's
reliability, technical competence, financial stability, and manufacturing capability. A
good way to evaluate whether the service provider is capable of delivering on its promise
of service is by checking client references. However, this evaluation process is not
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foolproof since it could be biased by the client's perception and, at the same time, service
providers may want to put forward only their best references to their prospective clients.
Extant literature suggests that trust, control, and costs are important perspectives in
influencing the duration of outsourcing relationships. In this section, an investigation
was undertaken to understand the importance and cost implications of the role of trust
and control in acquirer-supplier relationships.
2.4.1 Client's perspective on trust.
Vendor selection is a reflection of the client's trust in the vendor's capabilities and
credentials. However, there are instances when the vendors have to take up cost risks
while offering a competitive value proposition at the start of their relationship with the
client. Wadhwa and Ravindran (2006) have investigated this scenario with multiobjective vendor selection and vendor selection models with quantity discounts as a case
in point. This practice is quite common, but it is important to keep the consequences in
mind. Called the winner's curse, Willcocks and Lacity (2006) describe the curse as
protracted hostilities that are borne out of a bidding war when the chosen vendor seeks to
restore profitability to an initially disastrous business model. Also, vendors can go to any
lengths by offering price discounts in order to clinch the deal, but eventually the vendor
may fail to live up to trust expectations of the client. On the other hand, clients may
choose their business partners based exclusively on trust. Tiwana et al. (2008) report that
Japanese outsourcing businesses are driven by knowledge rather than cost or value
drivers, and they prefer to do business with inner circles of trust which they develop over
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time. Japanese companies are motivated by access to unique technical expertise rather
than by cost-cutting considerations.
2.4.2 Vendor's perspective on trust.
It is equally important for the client to instill a sense of trust in the service provider.
Trust results from frequent and relevant information exchange; inter-group exchange
generates trust, and eventually facilitates more effective interaction and a better
relationship. It appears that a high level of trust in a client is associated with higher
quality standards and level of effort, which can increase cost, although it is expected that
lower transaction costs accrue from increased trust (Mao, Lee, & Deng, 2008).
2.4.3 Client's perspective on control.
Cross-cultural issues in outsourcing can lead to lack of control. Clients can decide
to manage their outsourcing relationship by negotiating a work-culture with service
providers. Approaches to achieving control may include the use of bridgehead teams that
spend significant periods in client premises, exchange of staff on a long-term basis
between cross-cultural partners, and jointly managing staffing and training issues
(Krishna et al., 2004). Tiwana et al. (2008) contend that the services of a client Bridge
Software Engineer (BSE) are essential in bridging the communication gap and
controlling the knowledge flow between the client and the service provider. Japanese
companies exercise control over the vendor by completely controlling the front-end
design, rather than using the widely followed western strategy of attempting to control
the development process or methodology used by the vendor. Controlling the design and
core technology allows Japanese companies to effectively accomplish this without
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compromising the user interface or functionality of the outsourced project. The BSE is
responsible for maintaining the separation of the company's proprietary business domain
knowledge from the vendor's technical knowledge while ensuring that the two are
effectively integrated into the offshore development process. The BSE also ensures that
stakeholders in the client organization are in agreement about the progress and direction
of the work, consistent with the strong emphasis on group consensus in Japanese
companies, instead of relying on independent contributors. A BSE also serves as a hedge
against project risk (Dibbern et al., 2008). This mode of working style can severely
restrict the service provider who has established service and capability maturity levels, as
well as processes to manage product life-cycle. Service providers might feel highly
inconvenienced in this arrangement, because they are still required to adhere to the
client's processes and deliver on their promise of service.
2.4.4 Vendor's perspective on control.
In offshore IS outsourcing, the success of IS projects depends heavily on the
quality of the requirements; they are difficult to define clearly and completely at the
outset, and sometimes must evolve. The clarity of goal setting will exert a strong
influence on the vendor. The need for control is likely to be stronger for outsourcing
arrangements than traditional ones for two reasons: (1) the vendors are removed from
those who set the requirements because of physical and psychological distance and (2)
for Japanese outsourcers, Chinese service-providers usually possess a lower maturity
level of project and process management and are not as experienced as their clients (Qu
& Brocklehurst, 2003). Mao et al. (2008) contend that client control over the vendor has
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a significant impact on cost control by helping the vendor prevent cost overruns, but a
limited impact on quality of project deliverables.
2.4.5 Trust, control and costs.
Literature investigation on trust and control in outsourcing appears to confirm the
fact they are essential elements required to reduce the total costs of outsourcing and
improve quality of service. From a vendor perspective, trust and control have different
roles in improving outsourcing performance and operate as complements. Trust has a
significant impact on project quality while control is significantly associated with cost
management (Mao et al., 2008). From a client's perspective, it is important to reduce
cultural and control costs by investing in relationship management with the service
provider. An offshore-onshore bridgehead goes a long way towards improving
communication problems and reduces cultural distance. This arrangement optimizes cost
savings offshore while maintaining closeness to the customer. The individuals assigned
to work onshore are typically the more experienced and culturally assimilated. They act
to understand the customer's requirements and translate them to the offshore
programmers. Working within time-zone bands facilitates effective synchronous
communication. U.S.-based companies have also started building offshoring
arrangements with Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean nations in an effort to minimize
temporal distance, reduce slack time, and improve productivity. For Europe, this means
intra-EU collaboration or collaboration with South Africa or low-cost nations, such as
Romania, Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine (Carmel & Agarwal, 2001).
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Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) suggests that the need to control stems from the
need to minimize the likelihood of suffering from a partner's opportunistic behavior
(Williamson, 1985). If requirements or software specifications are not clear, the vendor
can take advantage of the client. Successful collaboration requires that the partners be
able to communicate, establish and maintain an inter-organizational interface, and make
internal adjustments in response to a partner's action or changes in the environment of the
alliance. Explaining differences in time and effort for a client manager to undertake the
same task with different partners requires an explicit recognition of the social distance, or
differences in organizational fit, with these alternative partners. Overcoming or
accommodating such differences requires adjustment by the partners in order to achieve
the objectives of the alliance, causing one or both partners to incur related costs in terms
of time and effort. In some cases, the cost of contacting, contracting, and controlling may
be considerable, and may force the buyer to internalize the business process instead of
outsourcing it. Transaction costs can be sources of economic inefficiency because they
increase the need for a firm to monitor and control a partner to reduce the partner's ability
to act opportunistically (White & Lui, 2005).
However, Transaction Cost Analysis does not always identify the reasons for extra
costs that may occur with outsourcing. Hidden costs associated with the vendor
relationship are primarily centered on the impact of transitioning formerly internal
processes to external control (Duening & Click, 2005). In services outsourcing, for
service activities which are intangible, customizable, and inseparable, it is difficult to
preempt the hidden costs that are associated with service delivery. Standardization of
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services reduces asset specificity, meaning a transaction is less expensive if the asset is
less specific to one of the transaction parties (Willcocks & Lacity, 2006). Unexpected
transaction and management costs, costly contractual engagements, disputes and
litigation can make Transaction Cost Analysis prohibitive for the service provider and the
client (Schniederjans et al., 2007). As previously mentioned, in some instances, suppliers
underbid to win the contract, resulting in the phenomenon known as winner's curse. The
winner's curse occurs when a supplier makes unrealistic bidding promises to ensure it
wins the contract, but already knows, or subsequently discovers, that it cannot earn a
profit on the engagement. This could be the result of separation of the supplier's IT
outsourcing bid teams from the subsequent service delivery teams, but it eventually
causes a breach of trust with the client. This could also force the external account
manager to make service quality trade-offs to compensate for the losses, which in turn
could lead to additional costs to the client to account for the service quality (Willcocks &
Lacity, 2006). Hidden costs can arise from lack of adequate interpersonal skills in
developing and maintaining the buyer-vendor relationship. A rotating lead person
representing the client or the service provider can mean loss of organizational learning
and has the potential to create problems of trust in both parties.
2.5 Offshore risk mitigation
It is widely accepted that a big motivation for adopting outsourcing is to keep costs
down, enjoy the benefits of labor arbitrage, and concentrate on the core businesses.
However, this decision choice is not without risks. Extant literature and case-studies
suggest that many outsourcers had to call-off their outsourcing engagements after pouring
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millions of dollars in analysis and development, when they realized that they were not
entirely satisfied with the outcome and would be better off by moving the work in-house.
Nakatsu and Iacovou (2009) contend that the top 10 offshore risk factors are lack of top
management commitment, failure to communicate requirements, language barriers in
project communications, inadequate user involvement, client's lack of offshore project
management know-how, failure to manage user expectations, poor change controls,
offshore team's lack of business and technical know-how, and failure to consider all
costs. All of the above risks stem from the failure to recognize the importance of the
vendor's service capability assessment, trust and control reciprocated by vendor and
client, and cultural issues in outsourcing.
Human capital risks show up when an offshore worker is not as productive as an
internal worker and subsequently labor arbitrage loses its luster in the value-proposition
offered by the service provider. Onshore outsourcing usually has minimal human capital
risks because it is strongly in the domestic vendor's interest to understand and comply
with all local employment laws and regulations (Duening & Click, 2005). However,
when work moves offshore, productivity can be seriously affected by the service
provider's interpretation of laws and regulations. It is also important to build and
maintain trust among business partners. As globalization rushes forward, the history of
relationships among different people just does not disappear. Memories of war, sectarian
struggles, and religious animosities can still run deep. A history of mistrust can interfere
with activities such as communicating and delegating responsibilities (Kliem, 2004). It is
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also important to build bridgeheads with the client to ensure controlled knowledge flow
with offshore resources (Tiwana et al., 2008).
Although U.S. clients can benefit from an absence of many of the employment
liabilities present in the United States, many foreign countries do not have labor laws
governing matters such as workplace discrimination, sexual harassment, or privacy. At
will employment, which allows U.S. employers to easily terminate or lay off employees,
does not exist in countries like India (Duening & Click, 2005). This can limit the
flexibility that the client might seek in the offshore service-provider, if they plan to
control resource effectiveness. The ability to restructure the organization in an offshore
captive center, which is taken for granted in the United States, can be more difficult and
riskier in many foreign countries.
Project risks are defined as those that have the potential to prevent the offshore
business unit from providing the cost savings, strategic advantages, or productivity
improvements that are anticipated. Unexpected incompatibilities between software
infrastructures could lead to delays, cost overruns, and lost business and goodwill. It is
important to manage expectations internally, as well as with the outsourcer, before the
project gets out of hand (Duening & Click, 2005). Some risks that occur during different
phases of the project life cycle can be more difficult to manage during the early, rather
than later, life-cycle phase. During the feasibility phase, wherein a determination is made
whether a project is preferable to the status quo, the risks tend to be broad in scope and
difficult to manage. During the formulation phase, wherein defining requirements and
comparing alternatives occur, the risks tend to be narrower in scope and easier to
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implement. During the implementation and installation phases, wherein the former
involves building the product and the latter putting it into operation, the risks become
even more narrow and easier to manage (Kliem, 2004).
Most businesses have a significant amount of sensitive information, including trade
secrets, business plans, and proprietary business knowledge. Business functions which
are core to the business are usually not chosen as candidates for outsourcing, since the
client stands to risk its competitiveness while trying to save on costs. To manage the
information security risk, vendor organizations should adopt and be able to prove
compliance with global best practices and standards. Many firms turn to managedsecurity providers (MSPs) to assist them in managing the risk (Duening & Click, 2005).
It is also important to recognize the Human Resources (HR) function, which is
responsible for retaining employees, resolving disputes with disgruntled employees, and
ensuring core business knowledge retention within the boundaries of the firm.
The risks associated with the vendor's organization are perhaps the most difficult to
accept because they are not easy to control. These risks can range from business
practices to authenticity of certification and reference claims (Duening & Click, 2005). It
is also possible that service providers may only want to put forward their best references
to their client and try to mask past failures. Vendor business practices can also widely
vary from country to country and may not be acceptable in the client's home country. It
is imperative that service providers are upfront and honest about their business practices
and set clear expectations with the client. Competency of the supplier is also a matter of
conjecture unless the client is responsible for due diligence.
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Whether the rationale is cost-savings or business transformation, an outsourcing
project is undertaken to create value for the buyer (Duening & Click, 2005). While the
service provider gains a new competency and thus has an added motivation to enter into
an outsourcing agreement, it is also expected to add value to the project or service, look
after the interest of the stakeholders, and ensure a successful outcome. However, client
expectations of the vendor may fall short of delivering strategic value or leveraging a
competency, and hence value risk is perceived to be a challenge in outsourcing.
In light of the above discussion on outsourcing risks that could affect the business
strategy as well as the resource effectiveness for the service provider, it is important to
apply appropriate controls to manage risks. Legorreta and Goyal (as cited in
Schniederjans et al., 2007) examined the potential risk factors and their implications, and
contended that the best way to manage risks is through firm-vendor partnerships and
through psychological contracts. They proposed ten best practices to mitigate known risk
factors.
1. Negotiate short term contracts or renew contracts periodically to improve
flexibility.
2. Include a provision to terminate the contract with smooth transition.
3. Use a pilot project to test supplier's capabilities.
4. Build experience by incremental outsourcing.
5. Retain key capabilities in-house while outsourcing technology tasks.
6. Develop pricing strategy that encourages innovation.
7. Hire an intermediary consulting firm.
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8. Manage performance through well constructed metrics.
9. Hire a legal expert to mitigate legal risks.
10. Create a centralized program management office to consolidate vendor
management.
2.6 Learning points and conclusion
Based on our literature survey, it can be inferred that clients who are successful in
their outsourcing initiatives carefully select the activities to outsource, rigorously
evaluate vendors, tailor the terms of contract, and carefully manage the vendor. The
researcher's goal is to secure more favorable outcomes in outsourcing engagements by
focusing on measurement and improvement of offshoring effectiveness with an
optimization approach. Below is a brief summary of the highlights of this discussion.
1. To be successful in outsourcing, it is important for a client as well as a vendor to
formulate an IT strategy. The IT strategy must be in alignment with the client
roadmap and offshoring strategy.
2. The service provider must identify its information systems capabilities and
evaluate if they are oriented towards delivering value along with the product or
service to the end user. The client firm is responsible for due diligence and
assessment of the vendor's capabilities before entering an outsourcing
relationship.
3. An improved business outcome is a result of carefully evaluating the client's
business functions and developing innovative measures that make the service
provider look more competitive in its value proposition.
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4. Optimization through cost savings is a primitive benefit. Clients seek to gain a
new competency, improve productivity, and seek potential improvement
opportunities in their organization by way of outsourcing. If clients cannot save
much on the costs, they stand to gain in productivity and quality from such a
partnership.
5. It is important to identify the hidden costs involved in an outsourcing relationship
to ensure a successful business outcome.
6. Trust and social interaction are important tools to bridge communication gaps and
cultural barriers, and to reduce offshore transaction costs.
7. Offshoring risks can be classified under these broad categories - human capital
risks, legal issues and limitations, project risks, security risks, vendor's
organization risks, and value risks.
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CHAPTER 3: Method of Investigation

3.1 Overview
The researcher conducted an investigation primarily from a vendor's standpoint to
learn how service providers view outsourcing issues and hidden costs. The initial
investigation was based on the IS capabilities framework and the 12 supplier capabilities
that a service provider must evaluate in order to be successful in supporting business
transformation or improving business outcomes for stakeholders (Willcocks & Lacity,
2006). This was followed by more rigorous research on the items that were considered as
crucial, to determine the problems that IT outsourcing arrangements suffer in the face of
competition posed by global resource providers. The scope of the current research was
limited to an investigation of offshoring strategy and offshore resource effectiveness,
which we felt were the primary drivers behind outsourcing relationships. Offshoring
effectiveness was evaluated from an acquirer as well as a service provider perspective,
performance metrics were devised to evaluate offshore based project activities, and
measures were proposed to improve business functions. These items were generated
based on previous IS outsourcing research and a feedback questionnaire, and case studies
were researched to explore the relevance of the outsourcing issues in the context of
acquirer supplier relationships. Each of these metrics and their evaluation categories are
described below:
•

Offshore resource effectiveness
o Resource (people and infrastructure) utilization
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o Average age of IT worker and effect on productivity
o

Cost of attrition

o

Service capability and maturity levels

o Leadership selection in a captive center and cultural issues
•

Offshore business strategy
o Core competencies (capabilities and resources) of the outsourcer
o

Cost motivation

o Co-operation and control
o Risk mitigation
3.2 Review of the literature
An extensive literature review was undertaken with the help of literary and
business resources, books, and technical journals on IT outsourcing to determine the
drivers behind the organizational need for achieving high-performing back offices
(Willcocks & Lacity, 2006) and the motivation for outsourcing, and to learn about the
benefits and pitfalls of existing offshoring scenario experienced by service providers as
well as outsourcing companies. Outsourcing has become a global phenomenon, with
many East European and Latin American nations joining India, China, and the
Philippines in the race to deliver services at a competitive price. The supplier base is
equally diverse. There are onshore service providers with specialized skills who work
from the client site or the same geographic region. They are usually complemented by
offshore providers who base their appeal on their ability to provide well-qualified staff at
low unit labor costs, and who are willing to work with obsolete technologies and legacy
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software. Then there are transformational outsourcers who apply a combination of
sophisticated management techniques and technology investment to achieve new levels
of service performance. The current offshoring trend is to move away from a
manufacturing-based outsourcing model to a services-outsourcing one, and the literature
case studies point to the fact that not many countries were successful in making that
transition. As part of the literature investigation, the researcher explored the CMMI® for
Services (CMMI-SVC) framework to better understand the capability and maturity-level
expectations of a service provider. It is important to recognize the fact that the service
provider could be located geographically in any corner of the world, and it is important to
look at the front-office mindset of the service provider who is offering back-office
transformational solutions to the client. A number of these outsourcing issues have been
discussed in Chapter 2, starting with the conceptual and review papers followed by
papers on vendor perspectives on IT outsourcing, outsourcing risks, hidden costs of
offshore outsourcing, cross-cultural issues, trade-offs between efficiency and learning,
and finally supplier evaluation and selection.
3.3 Survey questionnaire
Field research was conducted with a survey questionnaire to verify the content
domain and refine the measurement items. There were three primary goals of the survey.
The first was to learn about the best practices of IT outsourcing in the context of resource
effectiveness and offshoring strategy. The second goal was to gather sample data for
statistical analysis to validate our decision framework. Extant literature on IT
outsourcing was used to validate the experimental findings in an effort to better
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understand the motivation for outsourcing. A third goal of the survey was to conduct a
gap analysis of external service providers and compare client expectations with quality of
existing service levels. The results of the survey helped us understand the client's
motivation to outsource along with the vendor's level of preparedness.
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CHAPTER 4: Research Methodology, Results, and Discussion

4.1 Research overview
Extant literature on outsourcing highlights issues and problems faced by clients, but
it does not conclusively describe issues and problems from the vendor perspective.
Based on our literature research, we have constituted several hypotheses that can be used
as measurable metrics to evaluate offshoring strategy and resource effectiveness from a
vendor perspective.
A feedback questionnaire was put together to obtain data to verify and validate the
hypotheses. A pre-test was also administrated to further enhance the quality of the
survey questionnaire with the help of IT managers who were responsible for managing
and growing accounts in Fortune 100-500 companies. The questionnaire was then sent to
IT managers responsible for managing accounts and project delivery for IT service
providers and clients. The researcher took care to recruit individuals who were
responsible for outsourcing engagements. Three indicators were used to assess their
experience:
• The total number and size of accounts that had been managed by the respondent
over his or her career,
• The number of outsourced projects that he or she had managed, and
• The number of years in Project Management experience.
These IT Managers were directly and indirectly responsible for outsourcing decisions
and served their organizations in the capacity of Account Manager, Business
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Development Manager, Engagement Manager, Sales Manager, or Client Sales
Enablement Manager. These people worked closely with the outsourcing functions, were
responsible for business transformation and sales volume, and were able to share their
life-experiences with the researcher. All of these companies had significant global
presence, and the vendors were among the top 10 outsourced service providers in India.
1. Vendor A - A global leader in the next generation of IT and consulting with
revenues of over US$4 billion
2. Vendor B - A world leader in providing offshore BPO services with over half a
billion dollars in revenue from R&D
3. Vendor C - A $5 billion leading global IT services company with focus on
transformational outsourcing
4. Client A - A $3.3 billion Fortune 1000 company specializing in innovative
storage and data management solutions for IT services
5. Client B - A $1.6 billion Fortune 500 company specializing in IT services
The feedback data provided by the respondents forms the basis of the decision
framework. The design of experiment is under the control of the researcher and
consequently, the decision-makers' responses are a function of the controllable and
uncontrollable factors that have been tested to validate the hypotheses.
4.1.1 Service capability assessment.
Service capability assessment refers to the extent to which suppliers can
successfully meet the demand requirement of the clients who have an identified need for
a business function that has a potential to be better managed offshore. Willcocks and
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Lacity (2006) have identified the three critical provider competency areas as delivery
competency, transformation competency, and relationship competency. The clientvendor relationship is inherently built on the trustworthiness of the vendor's credentials
and their resource competency levels. However, it is imperative that the client assesses
the functional competency of the vendor rather than relying on the vendor's resources to
improve the chances of a successful outsourcing relationship (Ethiraj, Kale, Krishnan, &
Singh, 2005). At the same time, it is important for the service providers, who are making
the move from manufacturing to services outsourcing, to gain a true understanding of
their capability (Giao et al., 2008). As for services, it is important to consider
manageability, maintainability, extensibility, and supportability characteristics of the
service to estimate the scope of support and technical competency required to design,
develop, and support the enhancements to the business function from offshore. It is also
worthwhile to understand the limitations and problems posed by hosting services in
another geographic location while trying to assess the service capability of the service
provider (Heeks et al., 2001). The client can also reasonably expect the service provider
to meet safety engineering standards and to have processes in place to mitigate the risks
while managing the transition from a legacy system to a newer and mature technology
driven system. Although it is important to prioritize capability assessment over resource
assessment, one cannot entirely ignore the fact that the vendor's resources have an
important role to play in the success of the offshore project. However, it has been
observed that it is common practice for service providers to compromise on the quality of
offshore resources by assigning less experienced people to the outsourcing relationship
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(Mao et al., 2008). Knowledge absorptive capacity of an offshore resource is a function
of age and experience and, consequently, new hires can contribute as programmers or
bug-fixers but cannot really make an effective contribution to the outsourced project.
Service providers are also expected to interface with internal clients of the outsourcer,
understand their businesses, and address the client needs in providing services. However,
relatively inexperienced vendor workers cannot interface effectively with the client and
have to rely on a few key internal workers who are better equipped to handle the
situation. Following this line of reasoning, we hypothesized the following:
HI. Service capability assessment is required of a vendor in order to establish a
successful and enduring outsourcing relationship.
4.1.2 Cross-cultural issues in IT outsourcing.
For a reassuring atmosphere, people prefer to work with those who come from the
same culture. It is a transaction-cost barrier for others. It is easier to communicate,
understand, and monitor staff who have a similar cultural orientation, which in turn helps
to reduce contractual costs in outsourcing (Krishna et al., 2004). Some European
countries prefer to do business with their business counterparts since it is easier for them
to relate to the cultural demands of their host nations. It has been observed that it is an
accepted practice for service providers to train their staff on cultural nuances before they
work on outsourced projects. At the same time, foreigners and cultural issues can create
barriers for trust and control at offshore (Rao, 2004). It is important to keep in mind that
leadership selection can be a contentious issue for foreigners when they are assigned to
oversee the outsourcing operations in the offshore captive center. They might need to
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learn a new language, understand and meet their leadership expectations at offshore, and
adapt to the accepted rules of socializing without unsettling their co-workers. On the
other hand, we find that clients can use the services of a bridgehead software engineer to
co-ordinate knowledge flows between client and the external service provider, and to
overcome the communication and control problems posed by cultural interaction
(Dibbern et al., 2008). It is widely known that Asian software engineers, particularly
those from India and China, avoid asking questions to the client, which in turn leads to
false expectations and communication delays that can lead to loss of productivity. It is
important for the offshore leadership to assign responsibility to an offshore program
manager who can lead, motivate, and manage staff with a front-office mindset, build a
sense of ownership for their service deliverables, and set the right expectations with the
client. Based on this, we hypothesized the following:
H2. Cultural insensitivity and ineffective leadership can cause barriers in partner
interaction and interchange of knowledge between the client and the vendor.
4.1.3 Trust, control, costs, and IT outsourcing.
Trust and control are purportedly the two major decision factors that add up to the
hidden costs in offshore outsourcing. A client bases its supplier selection criteria on the
supplier credentials and in good faith, but the decision may be biased in favor of the
bidder who manages to keep costs low in an effort to win the contract. The service
provider can afford to account for the losses in the short-run by risking the quality of
service. This in turn can lead to a breach of trust with the acquirer who ends up spending
more money to account for the quality costs. Outsourcing also poses a major security
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risk when the service provider is privy to core business knowledge of the client and the
client is at a risk of exposing its strategic advantage to competitors. A client bridge
software engineer can potentially reduce these risks by controlling the knowledge flow
and make sure that the service provider gets access only to the knowledge required to
work on the outsourced service (Dibbern et al., 2008). This can also lead to a fall-out of
trust with the service provider who is at the mercy of the client interface and has the
potential for incurring costs due to communication delays. This could also potentially
drive out service providers who are interested in outsourcing to gain access to unique
technical expertise.
Trust results from frequent and relevant information exchange. Inter-group
exchange generates trust, and eventually facilitates more effective interaction and a better
relationship (Mao et al., 2008). Almost all outsourcing contracts involve a proportion of
the suppliers working at the client's base. However, it is a known fact that Indian on-site
workers are not paid the same wages as green-card holders or U.S. citizens. They are
likely to be paid less which usually varies according to the types of work permit held (H1B or Bl). This could put these workers at a psychological disadvantage. It could also
create a problem when workers are required to network with their U.S. counterparts and
display socially accepted forms of behavior. However, the propensity of outsourcers to
keep a large population of on-site workers to exercise better control over the outsourced
project can actually increase the total costs of outsourcing. In offshore IT outsourcing,
the success of IT projects depends heavily on the quality of the requirements; they are
difficult to define clearly and completely at the outset, and sometimes must evolve. A
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large on-site presence may not necessarily help in achieving clarity of approach but the
physical and psychological distance between offshore and onsite can be bridged by
employing a large fleet of low-cost skilled workers. If the buyer and seller trust each
other, the size of an onsite presence can be controlled more efficiently and transaction
costs of preventing opportunism will be reduced significantly (White & Lui, 2005).
Based on this, we hypothesized the following:
H3. A client's control over the vendor and a vendor's trust in the client will have a
positive impact on the quality of the offshored project.
4.1.4 Offshoring strategy.
As part of the outsourcing exercise, clients need to identify the core, critical, and
support functions for their business. If it is core and strategic to the client's business,
clients might want to establish offshore captive centers at cost-effective locations. If it is
a back-office function such as human resources, information technology, indirect
procurement, finance, or accounting, they can decide to outsource it to an offshore
service provider to radically reduce costs, improve service, and to increase revenues
(Willcocks & Lacity, 2006). An offshore client business unit can also work with local
service providers to address variable demand and grow or shrink a contract workforce as
needed. In Japan, the most prevalent form of outsourcing is to direct subsidiaries,
followed by an increasingly popular model where the client has a direct financial stake in
the vendor. Japanese companies are also historically motivated by access to unique
technical expertise rather than by cost-cutting considerations (Tiwana et al., 2008).
Given the diverse client base that service providers have to deal with, it is important for
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the client to know whether the provider has a one-size-fits-all approach to clients, or
whether they have a tailored approach for individual clients. A global strategy should be
in place to address the needs of stakeholders and the user community (Heeks et al., 2001;
Krishna et al., 2004; Manning et al., 2008; Rao, 2004; Willcocks & Lacity, 2006). There
is a potential for huge upfront investment to grow and sustain such offshoring
relationships, given the fact that the business volume of these service providers will be
driven by external clients and could be directly affected by the economic downturn and
subsequent recovery. An external service provider or business partner might combine a
client firm's operations with those of other corporations to gain economies of scale and
reduce the total cost of outsourcing, but at the same time the vendor is expected to be
upfront with the client on what it expects to gain from the relationship. The service
provider should establish and agree on an exit strategy with the client if the outsourcing
arrangement fails to work. As for the client, economies of scale, scope, experience, and
learning can be sourced from large firms better than small firms and these clients might
have to weigh the advantages of labor arbitrage and lower costs with the value for
investment in the long run. However, it is important to note that the quality of service
expectations and measurements are set by the client and even the best outsourcing
relationships can fail. It is necessary to single out the hidden costs for offshoring and
identify the limitations in the service function that can be supported from offshore.
Following this line of reasoning, we hypothesized the following:
H4. Offshoring is not apart of the client's product lifecycle and the major drivers behind
outsourcing are cost-optimization and business transformation.
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4.1.5 Risk mitigation.
Outsourcing can be a risky proposition even after pouring millions of dollars into
analysis and development. Communication delays, failure to communicate, and
requirement uncertainty can create problems in effort estimation for IT projects (Kliem,
2004; Nakatsu & Iacovou, 2009). It is important to note that the service provider is
expected to interface with internal clients of the outsourcer to understand their businesses
and their interfaces while addressing the client's service needs. However, it is imperative
that the client sets the right expectations and that the vendor has qualified and dedicated
personnel who can identify current service limitations and mitigate any risks that might
crop up during the service delivery process. Uncertainty can lead to vendor opportunism,
driving costs up in the process. Post-contractual opportunism can result when vendors renegotiate service contracts in an ongoing outsourcing relationship. In this context, it is
fair to expect that the service provider will expose all the hidden costs of offshoring up
front and set the right expectations on metrics of performance with the client, assuming
that the vendor has taken care to hire and train the best offshore resources, and that
offshore risks are not a function of resource effectiveness. Based on this, we
hypothesized the following:
H5. Offshored business functions that are inherently characterized by intangibility,
technological uncertainty, service complexity, and communication delays can lead to
vendor opportunism and risky outsourcing propositions.
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4.2 Sample and data collection
Our population sample consisted of survey participants who provided their
responses by answering the survey questionnaire. The experiment was designed so that
data was collected from both clients and vendors, and their responses were used to
validate the hypotheses in our decision framework. The following factors were tested to
measure offshoring strategy and offshore resource effectiveness:
4.2.1 Offshoring strategy.
•

Offshoring strategy
1. Outsourcers like to keep business functions that have a strategic value
either in-house or in captive offshore centers.
2. A service provider is expected to have a clear vision of the scope of work,
should know what they expect to gain from the relationship, and should
establish and agree on an exit strategy with the client.
3. An external service provider/ business partner must combine a client
firm's operations with those of other corporations to gain economies of
scale and reduce total cost of outsourcing.
4. Clients do not really stand to gain from an outsourcing relationship when
they are looking for cost-optimization and thought leadership from service
providers, if the providers' sole motivation is enhancing their skills and
domain expertise.
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5. Economies of scale, scope, experience, and learning are leveraged from
large firms better than small firms and are necessary to reduce transaction
costs in an outsourcing relationship.
6. It is fair to expect that external service providers can only do so much to
maintain stakeholder interest and customer service expectations.
7. Outsourcers prefer to work with offshore captive centers to address
variable demand, and grow or shrink a contract workforce offshore, as
needed.
•

Trust, control, costs, and IT outsourcing
1. The service provider's performance is a function of trust in its client and
collaborative effort and control exercised by its client.
2. The need for definitive client controls is more important in the success of
outsourcing relationship than possessing a high degree of domain
competence or process maturity.
3. Trust and networking are important tools to bridge communication gaps
and/or delays, cultural barriers, and reduce offshore transaction costs.
4. A service provider is more interested in the opportunity for a partnership
and product or service ownership is not really important.

•

Offshore risk mitigation
1. The service provider is expected to interface with internal clients of the
outsourcer, understand their businesses, and address the client needs in
providing services/products.
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2. It is important to estimate effort correctly to have a successful outcome in
an outsourcing relationship and reap gains from labor arbitrage.
3. The service provider should expose all the hidden costs of offshoring
upfront and set the right expectations on metrics of performance.
4.2.2 Offshore resource effectiveness.
•

Service capability assessment
1. The service provider is expected to support a value-proposition justifying
selection of its resources instead of the client using internal service
providers.
2. It is a common practice for service providers to compromise on the quality
of offshore resources by assigning less experienced people to the
outsourcing relationship.
3. New hires can contribute as programmers or bug-fixers but cannot really
make an effective contribution to the outsourced project.
4. It is necessary to have processes in place to manage the transition from a
legacy system to a newer and mature technology driven system, and meet
the safety standards of the client.
5. It is important to consider manageability, maintainability, extensibility,
and supportability levels of service delivery.

•

Cross-cultural Issues in IT outsourcing
1. Foreigners and cultural issues can create barriers for trust and control at
offshore.
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2. A client bridge software engineer is essential to co-ordinate knowledge
flows between client and the external or offshore service provider.
3. Offshore program managers are responsible for leading, motivating, and
managing staff with a front-office mindset.
A randomized complete block design (RCBD) was used for the design of the
experiments, where treatment means were compared to each other with a design
technique known as blocking, which is used to systematically eliminate the error effect
on the statistical comparisons among treatments. Randomization is the design technique
used to guard against a nuisance factor, which may cause variability in the response
variable. A nuisance factor can be unknown and uncontrolled, and randomization inside
a block is an effective way to guard against the effects of such a nuisance factor. In this
case the nuisance factor could be due to the individual perception of service capability
levels from a vendor or a geographical perspective. It could also be dependent on the
process maturity levels in the firm and associated production or quality costs for the
outsourced service. By adopting this design technique, it was possible to reduce the
experimental error and thus remove the variability between different levels of treatments.
The output from the experiment was used to determine the validity of each hypothesis.
In this design technique, we consider a treatments that are compared and b blocks.
The treatments represent the client and vendor responses, and the blocks represent a test
run for each factor under consideration. There is one observation per treatment in each
block, and the order in which the treatments are run within each block is determined
randomly. The blocks represent a restriction on randomization, and the only
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randomization is inside the block. We also assume that there is no interaction between
treatments and blocks.
Blocks
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Figure 4.1: The randomized complete block design
The statistical model for the RCBD can be written in several ways. The traditional model
is an effects model:
fi = l,2,...,a

In an experiment involving the RCBD, we test the equality of the treatment means. Thus
the hypotheses of interest are
H0'.Mi=Pi=

1 *
- = Ma where//, = - £ ( / * + r, +/?,) = // + r,

Hx : at least one //, * //y.

Expressed mathematically, the total corrected sum of squares is expressed as
Treatments

+ SS
Blocks

+50ssE

Because there are N observations, SST has N - 1 degrees of freedom. There are a
treatments and b blocks, so SS Treatments and SS Blocks have a-1 and b-1 degrees of freedom.
To test the equality of treatment means, we use a F-Statistic computed as the ratio of
mean square of treatments to error mean square
F o = M S Treatments / M S E

which is distributed as F a-i,(a-i)(b-i) if the null hypothesis is true. The critical region is the
upper tail of the F distribution, and we reject H0 if F 0> F a, (a-i), (a-i) o-i)
The data collected was represented below in a scale of 1 - 9 ( 1 - Strongly Disagree,
2 - Disagree, 3 - Slightly Disagree, 4 - Completely Unsure, 5 - Unsure, 6 - Somewhat
Unsure, 7 - Slightly Agree, 8 - Agree, 9 - Strongly Agree). The feedback rating scale was
developed to categorize the responses. If the response was "Yes," we chose an answer
with a rating between 7 and 9. If it was "No," we chose an answer with a rating between
1 and 3; otherwise we chose a rating between 4 and 6. The tabulated data was then tested
for equivalency of treatment means to validate hypotheses HI - H5.
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Table 4.1: Hypothesis Test for Service Capability Assessment
Service Capability Assessment
Factors of Interest

Factor!

Factor 2
2
2
2
2

9
9
1
7

VendorA
Vendor B
Client A
ClientB

Factor 3

Feedback rating scale :

Factor 4
8
3
6
7

Factors
7
9
6
6

7
7
6
6

123456789-

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Slightly Disagree
Completely Unsure
Unsure
Somewhat Unsure
Slightly Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Table 4.2: Hypothesis Test for Cross-Cultural Issues
Cross - Cultural Issues
Factors of Interest

Factor 1
a
B

0

Vendor A
Vendor B
Client A
Client B

Factor 2

Feedback rating scale :

Factor 3

8

7

7

9
6
7

6
7
5

9
7
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9

123456789-

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Slightly Disagree
Completely Unsure
Unsure
Somewhat Unsure
Slightly Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Table 4.3: Hypothesis Test for Trust, Control and Costs
Trust, Control & Costs
Factors of Interest

Factor 1

s

Factor 2

Feedback rating scale :

Factor 3

Vendor A

7

S

9

6

VendorB

9

2

9

1

Client A

5

6

5

8

6

7

9

8

93

Client B

123456799-

Factor 4

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Slightly Disagree
Completely U n s u r e
Unsure
Somewhat Unsure
Slightly Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

Table 4.4: Hypothesis Test for Offshoring Strategy
Offshoring Strategy
Factors of Interest

Factor!

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Feedback rating scale :

Factors

Factor6

1- Strongly Disagree
I-Disagree
3- Slightly Disagree

Factor7

Vendor A

7

9

2

8

4

8

4

Vendor B

9

7

9

7

9

2

9

Client A

9

8

6

4

7

2

7

Client B

7

7

7

6

7

2

9
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4- Completely Unsure
5- Unsure
6- Somewhat Unsure
7- Slightly Agree
8-Agree
9- Strongly Agree

Table 4.5: Hypothesis Test for Offshore Risk Mitigation
Offshore Kisfc Mitigation
Factors of Interest
Factor 1

I

Vendor A
Vendor B
Client A
Client 8

Factor 2
7
7
9
9

Feedback rating scale :

Factor 3
7

6

9
3
9

8
9
9

123456789-

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Slightly Disagree
Completely Unsure
Unsure
Somewhat Unsure
Slightly Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

4.3 Results
Using data from Table 4.1, we tested for HI and these are the computed results below:
SST =130.8, SSBlocks = 66.8, SS Treatments = 15.6, SSE= 48.4 andFo = 1.289
At a = 0.05, F o.o5,3,12 = 3.49
Since F 0 < F 0.05,3,12? we fail to reject hypothesis HI.
Using data from Table 4.2, we tested for H2 and these are the computed results below:
SST=18.25, SS Blocks = 6.5, SS Treatments = 2.9167, SSE= 8.833 andFo = 0.66
At a = 0.05, F o.o5,3,6 = 4.76
Since F 0 < F 0.05,3,6> we fail to reject hypothesis H2.
Using data from Table 4.3, we tested for H3 and these are the computed results below:
SST =87.94, SS
Blocks

13.69, SS
Treatments

= 15.19, SSE= 59.06andFo

= 0.77

At a = 0.05, F 0.05,3,9 = 1.01
Since F 0 < F 0.05,3,9> we fail to reject hypothesis H3.
Using data from Table 4.4, we tested for H4 and these are the computed results below:
SST =153, SS Blocks = 55, SS Treatments = 8.71, SSE= 89.29 and F o = 0.585
At a = 0.05, F o.o5,3, is = 3.16
Since F 0 < F 0.05,3,18, we fail to reject hypothesis H4.
Using data from Table 4.5, we tested for H5 and these are the computed results below:
SST= 13.667, SS Blocks = 0.667, SS Treatments = 11, SSE= 2 andF o = 11.001
At a = 0.05, F 0.05,3,6 = 4.76
Since F „ > F 0.05,3,6> we reject hypothesis H5.
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4.4 Discussion
HI: Service capability assessment is required of a vendor in order to establish a
successful and enduring outsourcing relationship.
There was a general consensus among respondents that service capability
assessment is extremely important for a successful and enduring outsourcing relationship.
Capability assessment should be prioritized over resource assessment, and it is important
to evaluate the service capability levels in terms of relationship competency, delivery
competency, and transformation competency. It was assumed that the resource hiring
process, work environment, access to knowledge resources, training and development,
testing on acquired knowledge, and technological skill capability were under
management control, and these factors could not have an interaction effect on service
capability assessment. The clients were also confident of their assessment that the
vendors have always deployed their best resources to handle their offshoring
engagements. The vendors, on the other hand, expressed a view that they have
established processes in place that let them use less experienced people and new college
graduates to implement low-level programs and specifications, which in no way cause a
problem with the outsourcing relationship. It was felt that even the best of resources
would fail to be effective if service competency centers are not established and processes
are not in place to manage transition and service delivery. The results confirm that this
hypothesis is true and that it had a significant effect on determining resource
effectiveness.
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H2: Cultural insensitivity and ineffective leadership can cause barriers in partner
interaction and interchange of knowledge between the client and the vendor.
There was a general consensus among respondents that cultural barriers and
communication issues could create a problem in an outsourcing relationship. However,
the client respondents did not think that foreigners or expatriates cannot be effective
leaders or were not able to comprehend why they could have a problematic working
relationship with offshore staff. The vendors, on the other hand, felt that they could be a
source of problem at offshore because of the inherent cultural differences and different
perceptions in accepted mode of social behavior. All respondents agreed that there
always exists a client point person who helps in bridging cultural gaps and managing the
transition of knowledge by acting as gate-keepers. The role of the program manager was
emphasized as critical in controlling and coordinating the engagement as well as in
resolving differences between the outsourcer and the service provider. It was felt by the
client that it is often a challenge to make the offshore program manager lead, motivate,
and manage the staff with a front-office mindset. The results confirm that this hypothesis
is true and that it had a significant effect on determining resource effectiveness.
H3: A client's control over the vendor and a vendor's trust in the client will have a
positive impact on the quality of the offshored project.
It was established by the respondents that the service provider's performance is a
function of trust in their client and collaborative effort and control exercised by their
client. It required both client and service provider to apply controls by way of ensuring
continuous flow of communication between both parties, ensuring client reference
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checks, and monitoring vendor opportunism and inter-firm adaptation. The general
consensus was that client's control would have a significant effect in improving the
quality but would not help to keep costs down. Vendors felt that it would be in the
client's best interest to let them maximize control over the engagement as vendors will
always have a vested interest to maintain business continuity. The vendors felt the
service provider had the domain competence to deliver their projects and the clients
should engage in frequent and relevant information exchange with them to build a trust
relationship. If the trust is missing, the service provider would prefer to exit from a
relationship if the relationship does not transcend to a partnership mode and remains as a
commodity servicing affair. However, it is required to set clear expectations at the initial
stages of the engagement by assessing the client's needs and what is required to ensure a
successful business outcome. At the same time, it is expected that the client has
appropriate controls in place to measure productivity and monitor vendor opportunism.
Clients and vendors felt that large vendors have existing processes and frameworks to
navigate through the unknowns and can leverage on their knowledge management
processes to improve performance, quality of deliverables, and reduce outsourcing costs.
Vendors also felt that lesser experienced developers do most of the heavy lifting in the
learning processes of the engagements and should be working offshore under the project
leadership, and at the same time the client should trust the offshore project leadership to
deliver on their assessed levels of capability. The vendors firmly believe that offshore
project risks attributed to resource inexperience would be better taken care of by offshore
project management. Inherent problems created by lack of trust due to inexperience were
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not recognized by either client or vendor. Vendors felt that communication with the
project sponsor or business owner should be initiated by the delivery manager and the
program manager and that technical resources do not need to interface with the client
because they may create a breach of trust with the client. The results confirm that this
hypothesis is true and that it had a significant effect on determining offshoring strategy.
H4: Offshoring is not apart of the client's product lifecycle and the major drivers behind
outsourcing are cost-optimization and business transformation.
There was a general consensus among clients and vendors that offshoring has not
traditionally been a part of the product's lifecycle. Client's motivation for offshoring is
driven by the need to focus on core businesses, keep costs down, add a new competency,
and gain improved quality of service. The service provider is required to do a detailed
assessment of the client's service needs, understand what is missing, and determine what
needs to be delivered to the client. The service provider is expected to have a clear vision
in the scope of work and what they expect to gain from the relationship. Since the onus
is on cost-optimization and business transformation, the service provider is expected to
have established service delivery competency levels and a competitive price-offering that
heavily relies on effective use of knowledge management that is gained by combining a
client firm's operations with those of other corporations to gain economies of scale.
Vendors felt that they have adequate processes supported by their human resources
function that help prevent attrition of middle and top-level managers, and competency
centers that allow them to retain domain-specific knowledge processes within the
boundaries of the firm. At the same time, vendors felt that they are better equipped to

58

support business transformation and support functions for offshore captive centers, as
they have been able to leverage knowledge competencies from their centers of excellence
at offshore and onsite locations. The results confirm that this hypothesis is true and that
it had a significant effect on determining offshoring strategy.
H5: Offshored business functions that are inherently characterized by intangibility,
technological uncertainty, service complexity and communication delays can lead to
vendor opportunism and risky outsourcing propositions.
Respondents felt vendor opportunism is not relevant in this context and that there
are other factors that contribute to risk perception. Thus, they have rejected this
hypothesis. Risk management is an important issue from both a client and vendor
perspective, and both parties are keen on managing the risk. However, there has been a
wide variance in their observations of perceived risks and ways to mitigate those risks.
Risks can stem from the uncertainty or inadequacy of client requirements and
communication issues. Sometimes, vendors decide to take on risks while reacting to
unfavorable or unknown marketing conditions. From a vendor's perspective, it is
important to take a risk while bidding for a new project and at the onset of a new
relationship with a client. Risk costs are usually built into the premium and competitive
prices are offered by the vendor after a rigorous requirement review by the business
owners and the technical managers. It is also important that the service provider should
be extremely transparent about their capabilities. However, we cannot discount the
human capital risks and the uncontrollable factors in a relationship and even the best of
vendors can fall short of meeting or exceeding the client's service expectations. A
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managed service provider who owns the service from end-to-end is likely to have fewer
problems and fewer risk probabilities than a provider who is contracted to work on a
small piece of the service infrastructure. Inadequate knowledge management by the
client can be a major risk for failure of an outsourcing relationship. The author has
experienced several situations where ineffective knowledge controls have resulted in poor
technical documentation. Reverse engineering of source code has failed to yield
knowledge about the business processes and the business interfaces that are required to
support service delivery. This has resulted in wasteful expenditures incurred by client
and vendor, whose resources had to invest time and energy in understanding the business
domain and the interaction between the interfaces of components that make up the
service architecture. At the same time, knowledge owners are limited to some client and
vendor resources, who have not documented the existing knowledge processes and the
firm is at a continuous risk of losing product-specific domain learning. It is important to
note that any investments in data warehousing and data mining systems, employee
training applications, e-learning applications, and knowledge management systems are
bound to fail, since the client has not addressed the root cause of the problem. It is also
improbable to expect that a service provider can be truly effective unless they are able to
consolidate the business knowledge with that of other firms to gain economies of scale
and reduce total costs of outsourcing. From an application perspective, it is important to
recognize the inherent issues in reusing the service components for multiple client
scenarios. Vendors recognized the importance of domain knowledge management
processes, but were not specific about the reusability and customizability of component
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services and it was not possible to estimate the hidden costs behind the service delivery.
Also, vendors stressed the importance of managed service providers whereby they could
manage the service from end-to-end, and exercise better controls on application design,
reusability, testability, and documented processes. The research suggests that there are
several issues in service delivery that border on uncertainty, which could create problems
for small as well as large vendors, and inability to substantiate reasons for outsourcing
failure has been falsely interpreted as vendor opportunism. The results confirm that this
hypothesis is false and that it does not have a significant effect on determining offshoring
strategy.
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CHAPTER 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendation

5.1 Summary
In this paper we discussed issues current to the outsourcing community, focused on
the limitations and psychological drawbacks, and attempted to interpret the controllable
and the unknown factors that make outsourcing a risky business proposition. Literature
on outsourcing does not focus on the issues from an external service provider perspective,
and the goal of this paper was to present our findings from this perspective. We
conducted a detailed investigation on the outsourcing phenomenon and the merits and
demerits of outsourcing, and we looked for answers as to why some outsourcing ventures
succeed and why others do not. We followed with analytical research on the
measurement and improvement of offshoring effectiveness of an IT development or
maintenance project. An experiment was devised to collect data using a survey
questionnaire and to understand the implications of resource effectiveness and offshoring
strategy in offshoring success stories. The next step was to validate and verify the
collected data using statistical analysis, where we tried to eliminate the noise and the
interaction effects between the treatments. Our findings from the experiment were
presented in Section 4.4, where we discussed the importance and significance of each
measurement metric on offshoring effectiveness. Finally, we discussed the cost
motivation behind outsourcing and the opportunities for cost optimization and we
proposed measures to improve offshoring effectiveness.
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5.2 Conclusions
The current research has given us insight into the state of the multi-billion dollar
outsourcing industry. It has provided an opportunity to understand what works for
outsourcing and also an opportunity to learn from past mistakes. The research has
provided us with a vendor's perspective, which includes the firm's decision to work with
external service providers, to set up wholly-owned subsidiary units in cost-effective
global locations, and to measure inherent factors that affect offshoring effectiveness in
terms of labor arbitrage, productivity, and capacity utilization. The success of an
outsourcing relationship is heavily biased on the client's decision to choose the right
vendor. The selection of a good vendor from a pool of global vendors is an objective
decision based on the vendor's credentials and proven ability to deliver the benefits that
the internal IT organization has failed to achieve. Each firm may have different vendor
selection criteria, and it is reasonable to expect that the vendors may meet some selection
criteria and fail in some other criteria. To mitigate the risks of failure, clients may use
selective outsourcing when they work with different vendors located in separate
geographic regions. The most common benefits sought are financial but not at the cost of
compromising value and long-term benefits.
It is, however, important to note that the experience level of a global vendor may
have a positive impact in an outsourcing relationship. Economies of scale, scope,
experience, and learning can be leveraged from large firms better than small firms and
are necessary to reduce transaction costs in outsourcing. Service providers from large
firms are better equipped to provide leadership guidance and niche expertise to the client
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firm. They can also offer improved services because of their matured processes at both
ends of the outsourcing relationship.
The researchers took care to evaluate both large and small vendors and found that
clients never failed to stress the importance of transparency, honesty, and trust in an
outsourcing relationship. Vendors are expected to be upfront with their capability levels,
and the expectation is that the offshore program manager will be responsible for leading,
motivating, and managing staff with a front-office mindset. The vendor's front office
should set proper expectations with the client on metrics of performance and expose all
the hidden costs of offshoring upfront. The researchers also felt that decisions, such as
which IT functions needed to be outsourced and which needed to be kept in house, had
long-term impact. It is also important to bear in mind that service providers, who had
been successful in building competency centers by leveraging on the knowledge
processes gathered through projects carried out for U.S. and European clients, are in a
unique position to support technology functions in a wide variety of business functions.
Client firms, who do not want to risk losing their proprietary core expertise, should reevaluate their decision choices, since these service providers might be in a better position
to leverage their acquired knowledge processes and help them survive in a competitive
market. The researchers learned that not all client firms were aware of effective client
controls or measurement metrics, and many vendors expressed their concern with client
controls and their effectiveness. A desired way to enforce client control and reduce risk
probability is an increased interaction with vendors by way of weekly review meetings
and technology discussions. However, this will only add up to the total outsourcing costs
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and reduce the value-proposition or the competitiveness of the vendor. On the other
hand, the vendors felt increased client interactions were unnecessary and they were better
equipped to deal with performance metrics than their clients, and client-controls would
unnecessarily add to the total costs of outsourcing.
Apart from client control costs, the researcher identified these costs as critical to
offshoring strategy:
1. Offshore resource costs
2. Infrastructure costs
3. Knowledge transfer costs
4. Communication costs
5. Re-specification costs
6. Business travel costs
7. Proposal and prototyping costs
8. Product development and technology transfer costs
9. Project monitoring and control costs
10. Product quality costs
11. Product disposal and upgrade costs, and
12. Onsite customer satisfaction costs.
Of the above-mentioned costs, [1],[5],[7],[8],[12] can be directly attributed to
vendor's service capability assessment, [3],[4],[6],[9],[10] to cross-cultural issues, trust,
control and associated costs, and [2],[11] to offshoring strategy. A majority of these
costs can be controlled by cost-optimization measures which are in turn driven by the
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client and the vendor's motivation for outsourcing. It is unreasonable to expect that
outsourcing costs can be reduced if the vendor's sole motivation is enhancing their skills
and domain expertise. At the same time, the client expects that a business relationship is
based on clear expectations and the vendor's ability to navigate through the unknowns,
and that their relationship with vendors should largely be successful. This holds special
significance for countries like China who are trying to make a move from manufacturing
to services outsourcing. The domestic IT market in China has not been able to leverage
their IT capabilities and the outsourcing revenue is quite small compared to that of India.
The literature review has suggested that client companies in Japan are more willing to
work with Chinese vendors as they usually possess a lower maturity level in product and
process management and it turns out to be a better value-for-cost proposition for the
Japanese companies. It may not take a long time for Chinese vendors to catch up with
the domain expertise that their competitors are able to offer, but it might take a while to
offer viable value propositions to their clients, since they do not have mature processes
that can help optimize costs. The cost implications can have a major impact on the
vendor's capability to build a product to service client's need vis-a-vis the vendor's
capability to provide services at offshore. It is easy to illustrate this point by judging the
effectiveness of a triage document that is commonly used for service support. Triage is
defined in Wikipedia as a process for sorting injured people into groups based on their
need for or likely benefit from immediate medical treatment ("Triage," 2009). However,
one must note that there are limitations on the use of a triage document. Service level
expectations may not be fully met with the help of just a triage document; they require
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domain expertise and an understanding of the business interfaces to diagnose the defects
affecting the chain of components that are part of the service. The researcher also learnt
that a vendor's risk management is focused more around business transparency,
operations, work environment, behavioral aspects, and ethical contract execution.
However, the researcher observed that vendor's risk management did not address specific
issues for service intangibility, technological uncertainty, and service complexity that can
lead to vendor opportunism and increased risk of failure. Although the clients or vendors
did not agree that these could lead to an increase in transaction costs and vendor
opportunism, the researcher felt there was a need to have processes that effectively
measure service metrics for the above mentioned and determine the service resolution
methodology at the onset of a new outsourcing relationship.
Based on our research, the following measures have been suggested as important in
improving offshoring effectiveness.
•

Service capability measures
o Ability to support these outsourcing service functions from a computing
and service availability perspective: Manageability, Maintainability,
Extensibility and Supportability. Identify service activities that are
inseparable and will be better managed at offshore captive centers.
o Ability to estimate correctly the amount of client contribution required for
offshore design and development.
o Ability to operate and maintain services from offshore with the promise of
uninterrupted service delivery.
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o Ability to support and maintain IT infrastructure investment from
offshore.
o Proof of safety engineering standards (e.g., delivered software should
support decision systems that help prevent working in hazardous
conditions).
o Ability to manage transition risks from legacy systems to newer and more
mature technology (e.g., re-architecture should yield performance gains).
o Ensure resources have right level of domain expertise to interface with
client's internal resources.
•

Cross-cultural issues
o Ability of offshore leadership to reduce client related cultural costs.
o Proof of measures taken to resolve cultural issues with U.S., European, or
Japanese clients.
o Replace foreigners at offshore with people who have cultural ties with the
offshored country to provide effective leadership and a reassuring work
atmosphere.
o Resolve communication delays posed by cultural interaction and address
hidden costs due to associated problems of trust and control.
o

Set right expectations with the client by leading, motivating and managing
staff, and building a sense of ownership.
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•

Trust, control, costs, and IT outsourcing
o Establish service provider's motivation for outsourcing at the onset of a
new relationship.
o Identify and resolve issues that could create an impression of vendor
opportunism (e.g., resolve uncertainty in requirement specifications).
o Identify if clients have controls to measure productivity and how these
controls relate to the vendor controls for measuring offshoring
effectiveness.
o Address IP protection and core competitiveness issues by using offshore
captive centers (for core operations) and outsourced service providers (for
non-core operations and variable demand).
o Build effective processes to generate trust and effective knowledge
transition via frequent and relevant information exchange, inter-group
exchange, and documented knowledge processes.
o Reduce client interaction costs and quality costs by mutually defined
control mechanisms.

•

Offshoring strategy
o Ability to effectively meet cyclical demand and maximize resource
utilization.
o Ability to meet service delivery expectations of user community and
stakeholders.
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o Identify client or country specific needs for unique technical expertise and
use them to gain entry into U.S. and EU markets. Leverage the need with
channel partners to seek U.S. and EU markets and establish development
centers at cost-effective outsourcing destinations that have a time-zone
advantage with U.S. and European countries.
o Build and sustain global strategy and competence centers that can cater to
unique client business and cultural needs.
•

Offshore risk mitigation
o Leverage knowledge acquisition process of service provider to negotiate
post-contractual opportunism.
o Establish benchmarks to bridge the gap between effort estimation and
knowledge acquisition process.
o

Address technological uncertainty, service complexity, and
communication issues jointly with client to improve service delivery.

o Ability to correctly estimate effort required to negotiate communication
delays, requirement uncertainty, and unclear software specifications.
5.3 Recommendations for further research
The scope of our study was limited to evaluating offshoring strategy and offshore
resource effectiveness as a measure of offshoring effectiveness. There are other factors
that might influence the outsourcing relationship and it is important to measure their
effects and interaction with the above-mentioned measurement metrics. It was also felt
that service providers have widely different approaches while dealing with a transition
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from a legacy system to a newer and mature technology driven system, and adopting
good safety engineering principles in software solutions and services. Vendors
reportedly have frameworks to deal with technology acquisition and transition issues, but
it was evident that quality and control costs can affect an otherwise successful clientvendor relationship. It is important to conduct research on the complexity of services and
services componentization with relation to hosted services, and the inherent limitations in
offshore service delivery. The scope of such an investigation should also include
research on the extent of redundancy mechanisms, infrastructure investment, and
customer support response times that can be supported and sustained by the offshore
service provider. Outsourcing in recent years has profoundly impacted many countries
and it would be appropriate to investigate the impact of outsourcing successes and
failures on social behavior, and how change in social outlook reflects on resource
effectiveness and the continued success of offshoring.
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